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LOST IN DOCTRINE: PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP,
CHILD SOLDIERS, AND THE FAILURE OF U.S.
ASYLUM LAW TO PROTECT EXPLOITED CHILDREN
TESSA DAVIS∗
ABSTRACT
Exploited and persecuted, child soldiers live lives dominated by violence, fear, and
death. Very few will find security within their own nations or abroad. Subjected to
exclusionary bars or rigid interpretations of the particular social group ground for asylum,
U.S. asylum law frequently functions to exclude those lucky few children who are able to
escape their persecutors. Scholars writing on child soldiers and asylum law focus, almost
exclusively, on the exclusionary bars and question of whether children are persecutors or
victims of atrocities. These concerns are critical because how courts view child soldiers
determines whether they will grant or deny asylum or withholding of deportation, however,
child soldiers face further challenges to gaining admission to the U.S. This Note argues that
courts must recognize children as targets of persecution by groups that systematically exploit
them as child soldiers. Recognizing children as belonging to contextually-defined, particular
social groups for the purposes of past persecution opens the door to grants of humanitarian
asylum thereby providing another avenue of protection for children who have suffered lifealtering persecution and exploitation.
I. THE PROFILE OF A CHILD SOLDIER .....................................................................
II. ASYLUM LAW OVERVIEW .....................................................................................
A. Origins and Definitions................................................................................
B. A Maelstrom of Precedent: Particular Social Group Case Law..................
C. Limited and Mixed: Child Soldiers in Asylum Law ...................................
III. AN INCOMPLETE DISCUSSION: SCHOLARSHIP ON CHILD SOLDIERS ....................
IV. MOVING THE LAW FORWARD ...............................................................................
A. Increasing Protection: The Benefits of Humanitarian Asylum ..................
B. Recognizing the Truth and Filling the Gap: Particular Social Group for
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Addresses Courts’ Policy Concerns ..............................................................
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[T]he rebels fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), machine guns,
AK-47s, G3s, all the weapons they had, directly into the clearing.
But we knew we had no choice, we had to make it across the
clearing because, as young boys, the risk of staying in town was
greater for us than trying to escape. Young boys were immediately
recruited, and the initials RUF were carved wherever pleased the
rebels, with a hot bayonet. This not only meant that you were
scarred for life but that you could never escape from them, because
escaping with the carving of the rebels’ initials was asking
for death . . . .1
∗ J.D., magna cum laude, Florida State University College of Law; MSc 2007 with
merit in Social Anthropology, London School of Economics and Political Science; A.B. 2006,
magna cum laude with high honors in Anthropology, Davidson College. I want to thank
Professors Coonan and Adelson for their careful attention to and comments on this Note
during its development, as well as for giving me the opportunity to be part of such an
inspirational class. I would also like to thank my family and friends for their ever-present
support and encouragement. Lastly, I would like to thank Nate Hill, Jon Harris Maurer,
and the rest of Florida State University Law Review for their hard work and feedback.
1. ISHMAEL BEAH, A LONG WAY GONE: MEMOIRS OF A BOY SOLDIER 24 (2007).
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States should not contribute to the traumatization of the child by
washing their hands of them though the process of exclusion from
refugee status.2

Ishmael Beah, the young boy running in the clearing in Sierra
Leone, escaped the rebels that day. Yet, within the same year, the
Sierra Leonean army forced Beah to join their forces.3 On that day
Beah became one of the estimated 300,000 child soldiers involved in
combat worldwide.4 For two years Beah was exploited and abused,
though his story ends well. When Beah was fifteen UNICEF workers
found and rescued him, beginning the long rehabilitation process.5
Fleeing continued strife in Sierra Leone, Beah made his way to New
York where he ultimately became an advocate for child soldiers,
drawing much needed attention to this global crisis through his
memoir, A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of a Boy Soldier.6
Brought into the public consciousness by Beah’s memoir, child
soldiers are once again in the foreground of the public landscape. The
case of Omar Kadhr, a young man who was only fifteen years old
when U.S. forces captured and detained him in Afghanistan, has
brought the child soldier debate to an intersection with the so-called
war on terror.7 In 2003 Khadr “allegedly threw a grenade that killed
a U.S. Special Forces medic”; his subsequent detention at the age of
fifteen made him the youngest person the U.S. has or is currently
detaining at Guantanamo.8 The U.N. officially stated that Khadr
should not be prosecuted because his family, active in al-Qaeda,
indoctrinated the young man into their belief system.9 As of February
2010 and over the protests of organizations such as Human Rights
Watch and multiple amicus briefs, reports indicate the Obama
Administration will proceed with a military tribunal trial of Khadr in
July 2010.10 Should the tribunal proceed, it will set negative

2. Geoff Gilbert, Current Issues in the Application of the Exclusion Clauses, in
REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 425, 473 (Erika Feller et al. eds., 2003),
available at http://www.unhcr.org/419dba514.html.
3. See BEAH, supra note 1, at 101-13.
4. UNICEF, Factsheet: Child Soldiers, www.unicef.org/emerg/files/childsoldiers.pdf
(last visited July 2, 2011).
5. See BEAH, supra note 1, at 127-78.
6. Id. at 209-17.
7. See Peter Finn, Former Boy Soldier, Youngest Guantanamo Detainee, Heads
Toward Military Tribunal, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/09/AR2010020904020.html.
8. Id.; see also Human Rights Watch, US: Improve Treatment of Children in Armed
Conflict (June 6, 2008), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/06/06/us-improve-treatment-childrenarmed-conflict (noting that there are other child soldiers detained at Guantanamo).
9. Finn, supra note 7.
10. Id.; see also Human Rights Watch, supra note 8; Brief for Nat’l Inst. Of Military
Justice as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Khadr v. Gates, No. 07-11J6 (D.C. Cir.
June 16, 2008).
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precedent for the future treatment of child soldiers under U.S. law,
treating them as criminals rather than victims of conflict.
Stories such as Ishmael Beah’s brought the plight of child soldiers
into the international spotlight. Khadr’s story proves the crisis
continues. Yet, answers as to how to best address or even legally
define child soldiers remain elusive. Asylum law has only a part to
play on the international stage as nations attempt to address this
crisis. However, as currently applied, asylum law “itself rather than
access to it is the main site of discrimination” against child soldiers.11
Courts fail to recognize that children are targeted for exploitation
because they are children.12 This failure leads to the corollary failure
to recognize children as belonging to a particular social group for the
purpose of past persecution, which forecloses to children the
possibility of humanitarian asylum.13 To protect children whose lives
have been derailed by war, asylum law must evolve to recognize that
former child soldiers suffered past persecution because of their
membership in a particular social group. This Note proposes a
general definition for that group: children living in countries where
groups regularly conscript child soldiers, who were separated from
their families, by force or circumstance, and were in their late preteen
to midteen years at the time of conscription. Before embarking on a
more in-depth discussion of the proposed particular social group, one
must understand why groups target children, as well as relevant
asylum law.
I. THE PROFILE OF A CHILD SOLDIER
Definitions of child soldier differ in detail but scholars agree on a
broad construction: a child under the age of eighteen, either male or
female, who is forced into service, be it military or supportive work,
for government or rebel groups is a child soldier.14 UNICEF provides
greater specificity, defining a child soldier as:
any child – boy or girl – under 18 years of age, who is part of any
kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any
11. Jennifer C. Everett, The Battle Continues: Fighting for a More Child-Sensitive
Approach to Asylum for Child Soldiers, 21 FLA. J. INT’L L. 285, 313 (2009) (quoting
Jacqueline Bhabha, Demography and Rights: Women, Children and Access to Asylum, 16
INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 227, 243 (2004)).
12. See, e.g., Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2003) (rejecting a former
child soldier’s claim); see also Everett, supra note 11, at 292 (supporting the argument that
groups target children because they are children).
13. See, e.g., Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 171-74.
14. See UNICEF, supra note 4; COALITION TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS,
CHILD SOLDIERS: GLOBAL REPORT 2008 SUMMARY 9 [hereinafter COALITION], available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/12/11/child-soldiers-global-report-2008 (defining child
soldiers as “any person below the age of 18 who is a member of or attached to government
armed forces or any other regular or irregular armed force or armed political group,
whether or not an armed conflict exists.”).
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capacity, including, but not limited to: cooks, porters, messengers,
and anyone accompanying such groups other than family
members. It includes girls and boys recruited for forced sexual
purposes and/or forced marriage. The definition, therefore, does
not only refer to a child who is carrying, or has carried, weapons.15

Accurate data are hard to obtain, so estimates of the number of child
soldiers are imperfect, but most organizations agree there are
approximately 300,000 child soldiers worldwide.16 While numbers
and definitions may differ, the grim reality is that the stories of most
child soldiers do not end with rehabilitation and a chance at a new
life free from threats of reconscription, abuse, or death.17 Those who
even have the resources or opportunity to flee the country of their
persecution face asylum law, which is profoundly ill-equipped to
address their needs and the particular form of persecution child
soldiers suffer.18 Children continue to lose their childhood and lives,
and U.S. law has yet to act to abate their suffering through the
informed application of asylum law to child soldiers.19
Child soldiers fit a profile. First, the paradigmatic child soldier
has been abducted, orphaned, or otherwise separated from his or her
family.20 Those children who voluntarily join forces do so because
poverty and alienation from family force them to join simply for food
and as a form of security, thereby undermining the voluntary nature
of such action.21 Second, though the average age of child soldiers
continues to decrease,22 a paradigmatic child soldier is in his or her
late preteen to midteenage years with the average being between
twelve and thirteen years old.23 Groups target children in this age
range because younger children are unable to carry weapons or
15. UNICEF, supra note 4.
16. Id. But see COALITION, supra note 14, at 10 (placing the numbers of child soldiers
anywhere from a few tens of thousands to 300,000).
17. See Everett, supra note 11, at 288; Mary-Hunter Morris, Babies and Bathwater:
Seeking an Appropriate Standard of Review for the Asylum Applications of Former Child
Soldiers, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 281, 283-84 (2008); Benjamin Ruesch, Open the Golden
Door: Practical Solutions for Child-Soldiers Seeking Asylum in the United States, 29 U. LA
VERNE L. REV. 184, 194 (2008).
18. See Everett, supra note 11, at 288-90.
19. See id.
20. See P.W. SINGER, CHILDREN AT WAR 15, 58 (2005). Statistics show that the
Revolutionary United Front, a rebel group in Sierra Leone, abducted approximately eighty
percent of the child soldiers in their forces. Id. at 15; see also Human Rights Watch, Facts
About Child Soldiers, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/12/03/facts-about-child-soldiers
(last visited July 2, 2011).
21. SINGER, supra note 20, at 62; MICHAEL WESSELLS, CHILD SOLDIERS 25 (2006).
22. WESSELLS, supra note 21, at 7. In Uganda, where child soldiers used to all be
teenagers, the average age has decreased to under thirteen years old. “‘Small-boy units’” in
Liberia and Sierra Leone are known for recruiting children under the age of twelve. Id.; see
also SINGER, supra note 20, at 15, 29 (noting that the Revolutionary Armed Forces used
children as young as seven as child soldiers and providing an average age).
23. See SINGER, supra note 20, at 15, 29 (providing an average age.); see also
WESSELLS, supra note 21, at 7.
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perform heavy labor, while older teenagers, though physically more
capable, may be less impressionable.24 Though the paradigm
inevitably excludes some child soldiers, unifying the characteristics
delineates which children are at risk of conscription. Children who fit
this profile and who are living in conflict zones where groups are
known to exploit children as soldiers are at an increased risk of being
forcibly conscripted.25
Groups targeting children do so deliberately—there is a method to
their tactics. More than just a desire to increase ranks or
opportunistic exploitation, “[c]hild soldiering is part of a warfare
strategy that is shared across lines of combat and war zones around
the globe.”26 An easily identifiable policy of such groups is that of the
abduction of vulnerable children. Some groups have a policy of taking
all children they come across, while others direct the systematic
raiding of schools, villages, and markets.27 Regardless of the nature of
the policy, rebel groups and governments make tactical decisions to
abduct children who fit their recruitment profiles as part of a
“meticulously planned [and ruthless] process.”28
Groups target children because of characteristics inextricably
linked to their being children—not simply out of a need to bolster
their forces.29 Children are more obedient than adults, as well as
more psychologically vulnerable.30 Children are, to a military eye,
easy-keepers; they make “fewer demands than adults, and thus more
easily serve at the bottom of military hierarchy.”31 Children are
cheap, rarely demanding pay for their service.32 Groups also target
children for their ability to elude capture, either because of their
smaller size or the fact that victims do not always suspect children to
be soldiers.33 Lastly, and perhaps most disturbing, groups know
children are “in such bountiful supply” that they are expendable
soldiers as compared to trained adults;34 another child will always be
available to abduct and exploit. These characteristics make children
appealing to those who would misuse them, making their
conscription anything but a “last resort.”35 Rather, children are a

24. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 20, at 58; WESSELLS, supra note 21, at 34-36.
25. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 20.
26. ALCINDA HONWANA, CHILD SOLDIERS IN AFRICA 44 (2006).
27. SINGER, supra note 20, at 58-60; WESSELLS, supra note 21, at 37-40.
28. SINGER, supra note 20, at 58.
29. See WESSELLS, supra note 21, at 37-40.
30. Jennifer R. Silva, Child Soldiers: A Call to the International Community to Protect
Children From War, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 681, 688 (2008).
31. Everett, supra note 11, at 292.
32. SINGER, supra note 20, at 55.
33. See WESSELLS, supra note 21, at 36.
34. Id. at 37.
35. Id. at 2.
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“convenient[,] cheap,”36 and easily exploitable group who appeal to
their persecutors because of characteristics intrinsic to their
being children.37
After conscription, children suffer particular and long lasting
harms.38 Children enter a new world as they become child soldiers, a
“social world [with] a culture of violence.”39 Groups indoctrinate
children by forcing them to kill or watch others kill strangers and
people close to them.40 Children endure torture, physical abuse, and
threats of death for disobedience.41 Some groups have even forced
children to engage in cannibalism as part of the indoctrination
process.42 Many groups force children to take various drugs inducing
addiction, frequently as an attempt to “steel children for combat.”43 In
addition to abusive indoctrination techniques, child soldiers suffer
the dangers and atrocities of war as both participants and victims.44
Often, groups give children the most dangerous tasks, such as
searching for landmines, because they are worth less to the group
than trained adults.45 Many children also suffer sexual assault and
rape.46 Studies indicate that “exposure to extreme atrocities has a
more lasting and impressionable effect on child soldiers compared to
adults.”47 Many child soldiers “suffer flashbacks, nightmares, sleep
disorders, and post-traumatic stress disorder . . . .”48 A child soldier’s
suffering is profound and inescapable. The unifying characteristics of
children at risk of conscription, the motivations of groups that target
children, and the severity of harm children suffer all help support
and delimit child soldiers’ claims.49 Before specifically discussing the
influence of each of these factors, however, it is necessary to provide
an overview of the purpose and substance of asylum law.

36. Id.
37. See Everett, supra note 11, at 292.
38. For a detailed discussion of the abuses child soldiers suffer, see WESSELLS, supra
note 21, at 57-84, and SINGER, supra note 20, at 70-93.
39. WESSELLS, supra note 21, at 57.
40. SINGER, supra note 20, at 74; WESSELLS, supra note 21, at 59.
41. See SINGER, supra note 20, at 71-72.
42. Id. at 74.
43. WESSELLS, supra note 21, at 76; see also Everett, supra note 11, at 297
(“[C]hildren are physically abused or given drugs, deliberately brutalized in order ‘to
harden and numb them into becoming more ruthless soldiers.’ ”).
44. Nienke Grossman, Rehabilitation or Revenge: Prosecuting Child Soldiers for
Human Rights Violations, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 323, 327 (2007).
45. WESSELLS, supra note 21, at 37.
46. See Grossman, supra note 44, at 327-28.
47. Everett, supra note 11, at 293.
48. Grossman, supra note 44, at 328.
49. See Everett, supra note 11, at 319; Ruesch, supra note 17, at 194-96 (discussing
the influence of each of these factors on the outcome of Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157
(3d Cir. 2003)).
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II. ASYLUM LAW OVERVIEW
A. Origins and Definitions
Asylum law is, at its core, a humanitarian endeavor.50 It finds its
foundations in attempts to address the suffering of persons displaced
and persecuted during World War I and World War II.51 Drawing
from the original creation of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees52 and the Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees,53 the U.S. ultimately enacted refugee protections in their
current form in the Refugee Act of 1980.54 The comprehensive
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) now governs asylum and
withholding of deportation claims. Under the INA a “refugee” is:
any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality
or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any
country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to
avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion.55

To qualify for relief under the INA, an applicant must satisfy
multiple prongs imbedded within the definition of a refugee. The
statute articulates five grounds upon which a person can apply for
asylum, namely persecution based on: race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.56 Per
the language of the statute, the applicant must establish a nexus
between one of these five enumerated grounds found in the statute
and the persecution suffered.57 Stated otherwise, the persecution
must have occurred “on account of” one of the enumerated grounds.58
The Supreme Court raised the standard of this prong by requiring
the applicant prove, through either direct or circumstantial evidence,
her alleged persecutor’s intent/motive to persecute her based on one

50. See KAREN MUSALO ET AL., REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 19 (3d ed. 2007).
51. See id.
52. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, An Introduction to the
International Protection of Refugees 6-7 (June 1992), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/
3cce9a244.pdf.
53. See MUSALO ET AL., supra note 50, at 34.
54. Id. at 73-74 (describing the origin of the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212,
§ 207(c)(1), 94 Stat. 102, 103 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982))).
55. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006) (emphasis added).
56. Id.
57. MUSALO ET AL., supra note 50, at 291.
58. See, e.g., INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 480 (1992).
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of the five enumerated grounds.59 For child soldiers applying for
asylum, the particular social group ground is of greatest import
because it is the category under which children are most likely to
make claims.60 Unfortunately, this nexus requirement is, as will be
discussed, particularly problematic for child soldiers.61
In addition to proving a nexus, the asylum applicant must also
establish that he or she has been persecuted as the term is
understood in asylum law.62 The statute recognizes either past
persecution or a “well-founded fear of persecution” as providing a
basis for the applicant’s claim for asylum.63 If the applicant
establishes past persecution, doing so raises a rebuttable
presumption of a fear of future persecution.64 Lacking a specific
definition, the general definition of persecution is “a threat to the life
or freedom of those who differ from the persecutor in a way regarded
as offensive, or the infliction of suffering or harm upon such
persons.”65 Importantly, the persecution suffered must be at the
hands of “the government of a country or by members of an
organization that the government is unable or unwilling to control.”66
Though most applicants must establish a fear of future persecution,67
an applicant can be granted asylum based on severe past persecution
alone, referred to as a “humanitarian grant.”68 The possibility of a
humanitarian grant of asylum will be addressed in subsequent
discussion of child soldier asylum applicants.
In certain circumstances, U.S. law excludes a person who
otherwise qualifies for asylum or withholding of deportation. The two
exclusionary provisions of greatest import to child soldiers are Article
1.F of the Refugee Convention and the antiterrorism bar created by
59. Id. at 483 (Denying applicant’s claim based on political opinion, the Court held
that Elias-Zacarias had to show that the guerrillas targeted him for his political opinion,
rather than showing that the guerrillas were motivated by political aims. Because
applicant did not establish this nexus between the persecutor’s actions and the victim’s
political opinion, the Court denied his asylum application.).
60. Everett, supra note 11, at 320.
61. See, e.g., Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157,183 (3d Cir. 2003) (denying
applicant’s particular social group for past persecution).
62. See MUSALO ET AL., supra note 50, at 229.
63. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (2010).
64. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1).
65. 3A AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 1006 (2010).
66. Id. § 1007.
67. MUSALO ET AL., supra note 50, at 245.
68. Ruesch, supra note 17, at 194; For regulatory language, see 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b):
(iii) Grant in the absence of well-founded fear of persecution. An applicant
described in paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section who is not barred from a grant of
asylum under paragraph (c) of this section, may be granted asylum, in the
exercise of the decision-maker’s discretion, if:
(A) The applicant has demonstrated compelling reasons for being unwilling or
unable to return to the country arising out of the severity of the past persecution . . . .
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enactment of the PATRIOT and REAL ID Acts of 2001 and 2005,
generally referred to as the “persecutor bar” and “material support
bar,” respectively.69 The motivating assumption of these exclusionary
bars is that some people are “unworthy of protection, because of
serious human rights or criminal law violations, or because they pose
a risk to the host country.”70 Article 1.F of the 1951 Refugee
Convention provided the foundation for the U.S. persecutor bar, now
embodied within the definition of a refugee in INA § 101(a)(42), 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42):71 “The term ‘refugee’ does not include any
person who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the
persecution of any person on account of race, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”72 INA §
208(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A) mirrors this language and
provides further grounds for exclusion:
(ii) the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community
of the United States;
(iii) there are serious reasons for believing that the alien has
committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States
prior to the arrival of the alien in the United States;
(iv) there are reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a
danger to the security of the United States . . . .73

Lastly, the terrorism bar of INA § 212(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)
bars admission to anyone who “has engaged in a terrorist activity”74
or “affords material support”75 to terrorists. Because of the statute’s
broad conception of terrorism76 and the absence of a duress exception
for either exclusionary provision, child soldiers are at risk of
exclusion under both bars.77 The majority of scholarship on child
69. Kathryn White, A Chance for Redemption: Revising the “Persecutor Bar” and
“Material Support Bar” in the Case of Child Soldiers, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 191, 19597, 202-03 (2010).
70. MUSALO ET AL., supra note 50, at 831.
71. Id. at 833. Article 1.F provides that:
The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to
whom there are serious reasons for considering that:
(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against
humanity . . .
(b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge
prior to his admission to that country as a refugee;
(c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the
United Nations.
Id.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2006).
Id. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iv).
Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I).
Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI).
See White, supra note 69, at 203-04.
See id. at 193-96, 201, 206-07.
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soldiers under asylum law focuses on the effect of the persecutor and
material support bars on child soldier applicants.78
B. A Maelstrom of Precedent: Particular Social Group Case Law
Particular social group precedent is nothing if not a muddled and
inconsistent area of asylum law.79 Because the INA does not provide
a definition of particular social group, courts have been left to do so
for themselves and the results have been less than satisfactory.80
Despite its inconsistencies, scholars note that more asylum
applicants now attempt to utilize membership in a particular social
group as grounds for their claims.81 Recognizing this as an
opportunity, these scholars argue “a measured response to the
phenomenon of social group persecution may help ensure the
continuing viability of the refugee definition in the twenty-first
century.”82 Restructuring how courts address child soldiers’
particular social group claims provides an opportunity to strengthen
this important area of asylum law as it moves into the twentyfirst century.
In the area of particular social group case law, all roads lead back
to the 1985 case Matter of Acosta.83 Acosta was a member of a taxi
drivers’ cooperative (COTAXI) which became the target of threats
and violence by anti-government guerilla forces in El Salvador.84
Ultimately, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied Acosta’s
claim, but in doing so it articulated a foundational precept of
particular social group theory:
Applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis, we interpret the phrase
“persecution on account of membership in a particular social
group” to mean persecution that is directed toward an individual
who is a member of a group of persons all of whom share a
common, immutable characteristic. The shared characteristic
might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in
some circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as
former military leadership or land ownership. The particular kind
of group characteristic that will qualify under this construction
remains to be determined on a case-by-case basis. However,
whatever the common characteristic that defines the group, it
must be one that the members of the group either cannot change, or
78. See, e.g., Ruesch, supra note 17.
79. See Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1091 (9th Cir. 2000).
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., MUSALO ET AL., supra note 50, at 619.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 620 (“[T]he Board articulated in his case an expansive and remarkably
resilient definition of social group that has resulted in the granting of asylum to members
of a great variety of human collectives . . . .”).
84. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 216-17 (B.I.A. 1985), vacated on other
grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
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should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their
individual identities or consciences.85

On its face, there is nothing in this conception of particular social
group that expressly excludes age-based groups from recognition as
particular social groups. Rather, courts have interpreted this
foundational definition with a reluctance to recognize age-based
particular social groups.86
While courts have been reluctant to recognize age-based
particular social groups claims, there are seeds of change that could
help asylum law grow to recognize carefully considered age-based
groups, such as child soldiers. In Gao v. Gonzales, the Second Circuit
recognized that the breadth of a particular social group is not
necessarily determinative of or fatal to its validity.87 Rather, the
category can “encompass groups whose main shared trait is a
common one, such as gender, at least so long as the group shares a
further characteristic that is identifiable to would-be persecutors and
is immutable or fundamental.”88 The court goes on to state that other
circuits have stood by the broad conception in Acosta of particular
social group, “however populous” the group may be, so long as the
members are “persecuted because of shared characteristics.”89 Thus,
rather than being per se improper because of its breadth, the Second
Circuit recognizes that particular social groups based on broadly
shared characteristics can be valid subject to certain qualifications.
Applicants proposing broad particular social groups must satisfy
certain requirements. In effect, the Second Circuit recognizes a plusfactor requirement when an applicant bases her particular social
group on a broad characteristic such as gender or age.90 The Second
Circuit reiterated that courts should “interpret ‘particular social
group’ broadly . . . while interpreting ‘on account of’ strictly (such
that an applicant must prove that these characteristics are a central
reason why she has been, or may be, targeted for persecution).”91
Importantly, the court goes on to state that in situations where,
because the group is broad, the applicant has a higher burden to
prove nexus, general country conditions may reduce that burden.92
85. Id. at 233 (emphasis added).
86. See, e.g., Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting recognition of
race, religion, nationality and political opinion as particular social group traits).
87. 440 F.3d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2006).
88. Id. at 64.
89. Id. at 67.
90. Id. at 69 (The court noted that in a previous case it stated that “broadly-based
characteristics such as youth and gender will not by itself endow individuals with
membership in a particular group.” (quoting Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991))).
91. Id. at 68.
92. Id. at 70 n.5 (“To the extent that the social group of which the petitioner claims to
be a member is exceptionally broad, the need for the individual to prove that he, in
particular, reasonably fears being persecuted is certainly greater. This can be done either
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Thus, previous asylum applicants basing group memberships on age
or other broad characteristics failed not because broad-based groups
are per se improper, but rather because they failed to sufficiently
establish a nexus.93
Other circuits recognize what seems intuitive: the very fact that a
child suffers persecution as a child can strengthen his or her claim.
The Third Circuit recognized this concept in Lukwago v. Ashcroft,
which will subsequently be discussed in detail.94 The Ninth Circuit
considered a case in which a young Russian boy suffered persecution
at the hands of the public and the government because of his
developmental disability.95 Though Evgueni’s mother was the
applicant, the court considered the persecution Evgueni suffered
stating that the fact “[t]hat Evgueni was subjected to such harsh
conditions at a tender age strengthens his claim.”96 Ultimately, the
Ninth Circuit granted asylum to Evgueni and his family.97 By
recognizing that persecution can be worse because the victim is a
child, the Ninth Circuit further opened the door for applicants such
as child soldiers to strengthen their claims of past persecution.
Past legislative action also sets positive precedent for the future of
child soldiers’ claims. Congress amended the INA in 1996 to include
victims of China’s coercive population control policies.98 In a separate
1999 case, the BIA denied asylum to a Guatemalan woman who
suffered brutal domestic violence.99 The BIA did not recognize the
applicant’s particular social group and found her claim lacked the
required nexus.100 Rejecting the outcome of this case, Attorney
General Janet Reno took legislative action to recognize “gender . . .
[as] a sufficiently unifying characteristic” for the purpose of genderbased particular social group analysis.101 The Department of
Homeland Security has yet to finalize the rule,102 but the importance
by showing that a significant portion of even the very broad group will be persecuted, or by
establishing that there are good reasons for thinking that the particular alien will be
singled out for persecution. The need for such proof will depend, of course, on the nature as
well as the breadth of the social group, e.g., it may be readily assumed in the circumstances
of a particular country that virtually every individual in a racial or ethnic group may
reasonably fear future persecution, even though the group is very large.”).
93. Id. at 69.
94. 329 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2003) (considering age as part of asylum applicant’s group
membership in claims of past and future persecution).
95. Tchoukhrova v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2005).
96. Id. at 1193.
97. Id. at 1196.
98. Ruesch, supra note 17, at 215-16.
99. In re R–A–, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999).
100. Id. at 917 (“Initially, we find that ‘Guatemalan women who have been involved
intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are to live under
male domination’ is not a particular social group.”), 920.
101. Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 68 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006); see also MUSALO ET AL., supra
note 50, at 814.
102. MUSALO ET AL., supra note 50, at 814.

2011]

LOST IN DOCTRINE

665

of the rule for child soldier claims lies not in its finalization, but
rather its very proposal. Its proposal evinces a potential avenue for
reform of the law to bring it in line with the needs of certain
applicants where the courts fail to address those needs.103 Taken
alongside the potential for developments in particular social group
precedent, the possibility of legislative reform of the INA plays a role
in bringing U.S. asylum law regarding child soldiers into the twentyfirst century.
C. Limited and Mixed: Child Soldiers in Asylum Law
Whereas the case law defining particular social group is
voluminous but unclear, the case law on child soldier asylum claims
is sparse and incomplete. Two cases constitute the primary available
precedent in this critical and highly charged area of law: Lukwago v.
Ashcroft104 in the Third Circuit and Bah v. Ashcroft105 in the Fifth
Circuit. Analysis of these cases reveals the two problems plaguing
child soldier asylum applicants: the failure of courts to recognize the
applicant’s particular social group for past persecution and the
application of the persecutor bar to exclude child soldiers.
Lukwago is both a success and a failure for those advocating
increased protections for child soldiers in the asylum process.
Bernard Lukwago, a young man from Uganda, made claims for
asylum and withholding of removal under both the INA and the
Convention Against Torture (CAT).106 Lukwago identified himself as
part of two particular social groups. He identified the first group,
used for the past persecution prong of the INA, as “children from
Northern Uganda who are abducted and enslaved by the LRA [Lord’s
Resistance Army] and oppose their involuntary servitude.”107
Lukwago then identified a second particular social group, for the
purpose of the future persecution prong, which he defined as “former
child soldiers who have escaped LRA enslavement.”108 Lukwago is a
success because the court recognized child soldiers as a group for the
purpose of future persecution. However, the case is also a failure for
those arguing on behalf of child soldiers, because the court failed to
recognize Lukwago’s proposed social group for the purpose of past
persecution.109 This distinction is critical and is particularly
problematic for child soldier applicants, as will be subsequently
discussed. Bearing this distinction in mind, it is important to have a
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Ruesch, supra note 17, at 215-17.
329 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2003).
341 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2003).
Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 163-64.
Id. at 167.
Id.
Id. at 171-74.
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thorough understanding of Lukwago as it constitutes the limited
precedent available for child soldier asylum cases.
Lukwago faced repeated denials of his claims until reaching the
Third Circuit.110 Finding Lukwago’s testimony lacking in credibility,
the Immigration Judge (IJ) denied his INA claims but granted
withholding of removal under CAT.111 The BIA then reversed the IJ’s
finding that Lukwago’s testimony lacked credibility but still denied
all of Lukwago’s claims and ordered his deportation.112 It was the BIA
that explicitly questioned the nexus between Lukwago’s particular
social group for past persecution and the motives of his persecutors.113
The great disappointment of Lukwago is the Third Circuit’s
failure to recognize Lukwago’s particular social group for the purpose
of past persecution. Recall that Lukwago characterized this group as
“children from Northern Uganda who are abducted and enslaved by
the LRA and oppose their involuntary servitude.”114 The court looked
at this group and saw a tautology: a group that, rather than
preexisting its persecution, was defined by the persecution its
members suffered.115 This tautology, the court added, defeats the
nexus requirement as “the shared experience of enduring past
persecution . . . does not support defining a ‘particular social group’
for past persecution” because doing so precludes membership in the
group being the persecutor’s motivation for targeting the victim.116
Where the court fails is not in its valid concern with a group being
defined by the persecution it suffers for the purpose of past
persecution. Rather, the court failed to accurately interpret the
characteristics of Lukwago’s particular social group and therein
failed to recognize that groups target children because they
are children. 117
One can attribute part of the court’s failure to recognize
Lukwago’s particular social group to the language Lukwago used to
construct it, language that bolsters the court’s concern with

110. Id. at 165-66.
111. Id. at 165.
112. Id. at 165-66. The BIA recognized the effect of Lukwago’s juvenile status on his
testimony, stating that “it would be unreasonable to expect a high degree of detail
regarding battle conditions from a young man who was only 15 years old . . . and who had
been assessed as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.” Id. at 165 (quoting Brief of
Petitioner at AV1 at 6, Lukwago v. Ashcroft, No. 02-1812 (3d Cir. 2002).
113. Id. at 171-72.
114. Id. at 167.
115. Id. at 172.
116. Id.
117. See Everett, supra note 11, at 292 (supporting the argument that groups target
children because they are children).
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tautology.118 Nevertheless, the court also based its rejection of
Lukwago’s particular social group and failure to find nexus on two
flawed principles. First, the court misconstrued the nature of age as a
basis for a particular social group claim. In one breath, the court
recognized that “[c]hildren share many general characteristics, such
as innocence, immaturity, and impressionability,”119 characteristics
which could serve to define a particular social group. Yet, in its next
breath, the court characterizes age-based groups as overly broad and
insufficiently immutable as “age changes over time.”120 Second, the
court used the fact that the LRA harms civilians of all ages to
rationalize rejecting Lukwago’s argument that he was targeted for
persecution on protected grounds.121 By combining these flawed
rationales, the court was able to reject Lukwago’s particular social
group for past persecution and thereby find his claim lacking
a nexus.122
Hardly unique to Lukwago’s case, courts repeatedly refer to a
child’s inevitable capacity to “age-out” of being a child as negatively
impacting their claims. Aging out twists the Acosta immutability
requirement into a death knell for a child’s asylum claim.123 One need
not look to asylum case law for the proposition that children will
inevitably grow up and cease to be children. However, when a court
rejects a child’s particular social group as untenable because that
child will one day be an adult is to miss the forest for the trees. If a
child was targeted for persecution because she was a child, the fact
that she will one day be an adult matters little to determining why
she suffered past persecution. While this fact may bear on the risk of
future persecution, courts, like the Third Circuit, are wrong to deny a
child’s claim based on the fact that all children grow up.124
The second flaw of the Third Circuit’s decision rests in its
interpretation of an evidentiary issue. The court uses the fact that
the LRA “persecutes civilians regardless of age” to support its finding
that the group could not have targeted Lukwago because of his

118. The language Lukwago chose—“children from Northern Uganda who are abducted
and enslaved by the LRA and oppose their involuntary servitude”—clearly uses the
persecution Lukwago suffered to define the group. Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 167.
119. Id. at 171.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 172-73.
122. Id. at 171-73.
123. See Flores-Cruz v. Holder, 325 F. App’x 512, 514 (9th Cir. 2009) (Herein, the court
looked to the fact that children grow up to justify rejecting the applicants claim as part of
the particular social group of Honduran street children.); accord, Escobar v. Gonzales, 417
F.3d 363, 367 (3d Cir. 2005); Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 171.
124. See Laura P. Wexler, Street Children and U.S. Immigration Law: What Should Be
Done?, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 545, 563 (2008) (“The reality that children will become adults
does not warrant ignoring their needs while they are children.”).
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youth.125 Finding this to be supported by the evidence, the Third
Circuit then upheld the BIA’s ultimate conclusion that the LRA
targeted Lukwago only to bolster its forces.126 The flaw of this finding
is that though all civilians are at risk from the LRA, the LRA does
not target all civilians for use as soldiers—evidence of which was
available to the court.127 There is a difference between terrorizing
populations, killing and raping men and women and the forced
conscription of children for service as child soldiers. Both tactics are
atrocious examples of the LRA’s capacity for harm. Yet, the fact that
adults suffer a distinct harm at the hands of the LRA does not defeat
the reality that the group systematically targets and exploits
children as child soldiers.128
Outside of the court’s failing to recognize Lukwago’s membership
in a particular social group, Lukwago does provide some positive
precedent for future child soldier applicants. Importantly, the Third
Circuit recognized the connection between Lukwago’s youth and the
severity of his persecution. In its evaluation of whether Lukwago
suffered persecution, the court drew attention to the fact that
Lukwago “was subjected to all of this physical and psychological
abuse as a mere 15 year old boy.”129 Though this statement is dicta, it
is also a positive recognition of the fact that children suffer
persecution as children and that fact bears on the severity of their
suffering. The court goes on to say that “[t]here could be no question
that the LRA’s treatment of Lukwago ‘constitute[d] a real threat to
[his] life or freedom,’ ”130 a finding which supports future applicants
in establishing persecution. Of particular importance for future
applicants trying to establish eligibility for humanitarian asylum, the
court also characterizes Lukwago’s persecution as “atrocious and
severe.”131 Doing so, the court brings Lukwago’s case into line with
Matter of Chen, the definitive case regarding humanitarian
asylum.132 By characterizing Lukwago’s persecution as atrocious and
severe, as well as recognizing the increased impact persecution has
on children, the Third Circuit set some positive precedent for
future applicants.
The Third Circuit’s rejection of Lukwago’s particular social group
for the purpose of past persecution, however, was profound in its
125. Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 172-73.
126. Id.
127. See id.
128. Everett, supra note 11, at 323 (“While child soldiers and adults are equally
recruited, that should not undermine the fact that child soldiers are particularly targeted
and persecuted because of their age and vulnerability.”).
129. Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 168 (emphasis added).
130. Id. (quoting Lin v. INS, 238 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2001)).
131. Id. at 174.
132. Id. at 173-74.
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detrimental impact. Though it found his suffering—having to watch
the torture and killing of others, being beaten and threatened with
death, watching his parents murdered, and being forced to kill his
friend133—to be “atrocious and severe,”134 the court did not grant
humanitarian asylum to Lukwago. It could not do so because it had
previously rejected the foundations of Lukwago’s particular social
group as insufficiently immutable and unique.135 Lacking a nexus
between the profound persecution Lukwago suffered and his
persecutor’s intentions, humanitarian asylum was unavailable no
matter how severe and atrocious the persecution.136 The only option
left to Lukwago was to prove a fear of future persecution based on his
past experience as a child soldier—a reality he was able to establish
and which the court accepted.137 Thus, while Lukwago found a
positive outcome, the case set negative precedent for child soldier
applicants by failing to recognize that children are targeted as
children and that age, when appropriately characterized, can play a
role in defining a particular social group.
Bah, a 2003 case out of the Fifth Circuit, addressed the issue of
the application of the persecutor bar to child soldiers.138 While the
inapplicability of such exclusionary bars to child soldiers is not the
focus of this paper, it is important to understand Bah, as it is one of a
very limited number of child soldier cases that carry precedential
value. Amadu Bah was a child soldier in Sierra Leone.139 After seeing
his family brutally murdered, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
forced Bah to join their cause.140 The RUF started Bah on cocaine and
forced him to kill and mutilate innocent people.141 Though he tried to
escape multiple times, it was not until 1997, two years after he had
been abducted by the RUF, that Bah escaped and made his way to
the United States.142 It was at that point that his struggle with the
INS (now the Department of Homeland Security)143 began.144
Bah suffered what most scholars writing on child soldiers and
asylum rail against: exclusion from asylum as a persecutor. Bah
made claims under the INA for asylum and withholding of removal,
as well as withholding of removal and deferral of removal under the

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 164.
Id. at 174.
Id. at 171-73.
Id. at 174.
Id. at 174-83.
341 F.3d 348 (2003).
Id. at 349.
Id.
Id. at 350.
Id.
Id. at 350 n.1.
Id. at 350.
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CAT.145 Both the IJ and the BIA denied Bah’s claims based on
statutory persecutor bars in place under the INA and CAT.146 On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit considered the application of the INA
persecutor bar and whether Bah was entitled to deferral of removal
under CAT.147 Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit denied both claims.148
The Fifth Circuit proved unwilling to consider the circumstances
of the acts of persecution Bah engaged in as a child soldier. The INA
persecutor bar, as stated earlier, denies asylum and withholding of
removal to people who persecuted others on account of one of the five
enumerated grounds.149 Bah argued against application of the bar by
stating that he only committed the persecutory acts because of his
“forced recruitment, [as such] he did not engage in political
persecution because he did not share the RUF’s intent of political
persecution.”150 Looking to the plain language of the statute, the Fifth
Circuit rejected Bah’s argument, finding personal motivation of the
applicant to be irrelevant.151 Thus, the Court upheld the IJ and BIA’s
rulings that Bah was ineligible for asylum as a persecutor under the
persecutor bar. As it was not raised on appeal, Bah provides no
assistance on the issue of child soldiers and delimiting possible
particular social groups. Rather, Bah stands only as a failure of
asylum law to protect child soldiers.152
III. AN INCOMPLETE DISCUSSION: SCHOLARSHIP ON CHILD SOLDIERS
Though there is very little case law regarding child soldiers as
asylum applicants, there is no similar dearth of scholarship on the
challenges children face under U.S. asylum law. Nevertheless, the
discussion is incomplete. The vast majority of the literature focuses
on the effect of exclusionary bars on child soldier applicants,
undoubtedly an important issue, but not the only challenge a child
soldier applicant will face.153 Though scholars note that children may
have suffered past persecution sufficient to warrant a grant of
humanitarian asylum, they do so in passing,154 or predicate the grant
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 351.
148. Id. at 351-52.
149. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(i) (2006).
150. Bah, 341 F.3d at 351.
151. Id.
152. See Morris, supra note 17, at 290 (Morris discusses the application of the Fifth
Circuit’s rationale to similar statutory bars: “Should other Circuits follow the reasoning of
the Fifth Circuit in analyzing the material support bar [or the persecutor of the INA],
former child soldiers, despite having been egregiously victimized by extreme physical and
psychological coercion and abuse by their rebel captors, are likely to be barred from finding
relief . . . because of their past ‘support’ of those terrorists, among other statutory bars.”).
153. See, e.g., White, supra note 69.
154. See, e.g., Everett, supra note 11, at 319.
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on unnecessary restrictions such as requiring the group to persecute
only children.155 While it is important to understand and address the
application of exclusionary bars to child soldiers,156 it is equally
important to ensure that asylum law protects as many former child
soldiers as is possible. Doing so requires convincing courts to
recognize an applicant’s particular social group for past persecution.
If courts begin to recognize child soldiers as a particular social
group for the purpose of future persecution, as did the Third Circuit
in Lukwago, why is it so critical that they recognize a particular
social group for the purpose of past persecution? First, widely
available evidence on the realities of how and why groups target
children supports recognition of certain children as belonging to a
particular social group of those targeted for exploitation. Second, the
recognition of children at risk of conscription and former child
soldiers as definable social groups by international treaties,
scholarship, and human rights organizations157 provides further
support for acknowledging that such children constitute a cognizable
and definable social group. Third, not all children will be able to
prove fear of future persecution, either because of changes in country
conditions158 or because the child may age-out of child status, therein
weakening a claim that he will be targeted for rerecruitment or
persecution as a former child soldier.159 Until courts recognize and fill
these gaps in the current law, U.S. law cannot fully protect former
child soldiers in the asylum process.

155. Ruesch, supra note 17, at 194-95 (“[I]f a persecutor persecutes only children on
account of an enumerated ground, then the former child-soldier arguably has a stronger
case for a grant of humanitarian asylum.”).
156. Scholars writing on why child soldiers should not be excluded from asylum by the
material support and persecutor bars base their arguments on three principles: duress,
infancy, and incompatibility of exclusion with international and domestic documents
regarding child soldiers. See, e.g., id. at 198-210; see also Grossman, supra note 44, at 34950. Though the reforms scholars propose vary, the core argument is the same: the very fact
that child soldiers are children demands U.S. asylum law treat them differently and, in
most cases, not apply exclusionary bars. See, e.g., Ruesch, supra note 17, at 216-18.
157. See, e.g., Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 54/263, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 (May
25, 2000) available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc-conflict.htm; U.N. SecretaryGeneral, Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc.
S/2002/1299 (Nov. 26, 2002).
158. Everett, supra note 11, at 319 (Noting that not all children may be able to
establish a fear of future persecution sufficient to argue that courts should still remain
open to the prospect of granting asylum in such cases based on past persecution. The
author, however, provides no guidance has to how to overcome the nexus problem
illustrated in Lukwago.).
159. See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 171 (3d Cir. 2003).
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IV. MOVING THE LAW FORWARD
A. Increasing Protection: The Benefits of Humanitarian Asylum
Recall that the Third Circuit found Lukwago’s persecution to be
“atrocious and severe” and therein sufficient for the threshold
requirements of humanitarian asylum.160 Paired with that Circuit’s
and the Ninth Circuit’s acknowledgement that a child’s suffering
may be worse because he is a child,161 many child soldiers have a
strong chance of establishing past persecution which is sufficiently
severe to make them eligible for humanitarian asylum.162 As “[c]hildsoldiers generally receive little or no protection from their country
and face substantial threats of deprivation of life or physical
freedom,” returning to his or her home country may not be a positive
step for a child.163 Humanitarian asylum is, therefore, an ideal option
for former child soldiers who cannot establish a fear of future
persecution, because it “offers a potential ticket to freedom to
applicants who have suffered the most horrific persecution, yet do not
qualify for asylum under the standard refugee definition.”164 No child
will succeed in getting humanitarian asylum, however, unless courts
recognize that the child suffered persecution on account of her
membership in a particular social group.165
B. Recognizing the Truth and Filling the Gap: Particular Social
Group for Past Persecution
Advancing asylum law to provide better protections for child
soldiers requires courts recognize this critical truth: groups target
particular children for characteristics intrinsic to their youth paired
with other immutable characteristics. As was detailed earlier,
children appeal to groups that exploit them, among other reasons,
because of their youth, impressionability, capacity to elude capture,
and the fact that they require less expense and care than adults.166
Valuing these characteristics, governments and rebel groups

160. Id. at 174.
161. See id. at 170-71; Tchoukhrova v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1181, 1193 (9th Cir. 2005).
162. See Everett, supra note 11, at 319.
163. Ruesch, supra note 17, at 195 (internal footnote omitted); see also Everett, supra
note 11, at 319 (arguing that the severity of the persecution children suffer and the fact
that some children will not be able to establish fear of future persecution requires courts be
“cognizant of the persecution such children have suffered . . . [and not] den[y] asylum for
lacking a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).
164. Rebecca H. Gutner, A Neglected Alternative: Toward a Workable Standard for
Implementing Humanitarian Asylum, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 413, 450 (2006).
165. See, e.g., Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 174.
166. For a complete discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 26-37. See also
SINGER, supra note 20, at 58; WESSELLS, supra note 21, at 2, 37-40.
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systematically target children for conscription.167 Furthermore, child
soldiers fit a profile: they are children in their late preteen to
midteenage years, who have been either forcibly or by circumstance
separated from their families and who live in countries where rebel
groups and/or armies regularly exploit children as child soldiers.168
Courts must acknowledge these realities and respond accordingly by
recognizing well-conceived particular social groups for the purposes
of past persecution.
A child soldier applicant’s particular social group for the purpose
of past persecution will of course vary based upon that child’s
individual story, but it will share certain unifying characteristics
with other claims. First, the child will have been separated from his
or her family, either by orphanage, abduction, or circumstance (e.g.
wartime upheaval). Second, the child will be somewhere within his
late preteen to midteenage years at the time of his conscription.
Third and last, the child will be from a country in which
international organizations and/or similar country reports show a
pattern of groups exploiting children as child soldiers. The general
model of the group can be articulated as follows: children living in
countries where groups regularly conscript child soldiers, who were
separated from their families, by force or circumstance, and were in
their late preteen to midteen years at the time of conscription. The
applicant must, of course, provide additional, specific details.
However, if a former child soldier applicant can prove all three of
these elements and that he or she was ultimately conscripted, a court
should recognize him or her as belonging to a particular social group
for the purpose of past persecution, thereby opening the door for the
protection of humanitarian asylum.
Such a construction of a general particular social group meets the
requirements of emerging case law without falling into the tautology
rejected by Lukwago. While age is a factor in defining the group,
there are two additional, perceptible factors that delimit the group,
thereby satisfying the Second Circuit’s plus-factor requirement for an
age-based particular social group. Further, by limiting the group to a
certain age range, the range scholars recognize as being most at-risk
for conscription,169 this construction limits the breadth of the group,
thereby satisfying courts’ concerns that age-based groups are overly
broad. Drawing upon the Second Circuit’s precedent in Gao, the
proposed group definition requires evidence of systematic persecution
of the group throughout the country.170 Therein, the proposed group
167. See, e.g., HONWANA, supra note 26, at 44.
168. For a complete discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 20-25. See also
SINGER, supra note 20, at 29, 62; WESSELLS, supra note 21, at 2, 7, 25.
169. See WESSELLS, supra note 21, at 7.
170. Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 70 n.5 (2d Cir. 2006).
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definition requires the applicant to demonstrate the additional
evidence the Second Circuit required of any age-based group through
a means sanctioned by the Circuit: a showing of broad-based threat
to the group due to general country conditions.171 This construction
will inevitably exclude some worthy applicants who do not fit the
proposed definition. However, its recognition by courts would
advance the cause of a significant number of child soldier applicants
and thereby be a positive step forward in the development of asylum
law in this area.
One avenue for this development is legislative amendment of the
INA to recognize the particular social group here proposed. Congress
previously amended the definition of refugee in the INA to include
persons coercively subject to China’s one-child policy.172 As one
scholar, Benjamin Ruesch, notes, that amendment is evidence of
Congress’s “willing[ness] to act to open the doors of the U.S. to
certain social groups that suffer various persecutions.”173 Building
upon this foundation, Ruesch argues that Congress should provide
similar assistance to child soldiers.174 Ambitious legislation could
expressly recognize all former child soldiers as being eligible for their
asylum and provide for derivative claims for their families.175 A more
conservative amendment could create a rebuttable presumption that
a former child soldier who can establish the three aspects of the
proposed particular social group (separation from family, certain age
range, from a nation in which children are regularly conscripted) is
eligible for asylum based on past persecution as part of that
particular social group. Any such amendment could include a
statutory cap on the number of possible children to be admitted to
answer potential floodgates concerns.176 Though a legislative
amendment to the INA may be an uphill battle,177 child soldier
advocates should explore this option as a means of increasing
protection for this much “aggrieved social group.”178

171. Id. (“To the extent that the social group of which the petitioner claims to be a
member is exceptionally broad, the need for the individual to prove that he, in particular,
reasonably fears being persecuted is certainly greater. This can be done either by showing
that a significant portion of even the very broad group will be persecuted . . . . [I]t may be
readily assumed in the circumstances of a particular country that virtually every
individual in a racial or ethnic group may reasonably fear future persecution, even though
the group is very large.”).
172. Ruesch, supra note 17, at 215-16.
173. Id. at 216.
174. Id. at 217 (“Congress should amend the INA to include former child-soldiers as
qualifying refugees seeking asylum.”).
175. Id. at 213.
176. Id. at 216.
177. See MUSALO ET AL., supra note 50, at 74 (noting that the INA has only been
amended once since 1980, to include those subject to population control in China).
178. Ruesch, supra note 17, at 213, 217.
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C. Necessarily Conservative: How the Proposed Particular Social
Group Addresses Courts’ Policy Concerns
Absent a legislative amendment, courts will have to voluntarily
recognize the validity of the proposed group for child soldier
applicants. While the proposed definition addresses previously
discussed concerns regarding the breadth of age-based particular
social groups, courts may still be afraid to recognize age-based child
soldier claims. This reticence may stem from a desire to close the
door to claims of youths trying to avoid conscription into gangs.
Gang-related asylum claims have increased in recent years and are
emerging as “one of the most important areas in asylum law.”179 Yet,
courts hesitate to recognize claims of children seeking asylum to
avoid having to join gangs, frequently rejecting the applicant’s
particular social group as being “too broad.”180 While a full discussion
of gang-related claims is beyond the scope of this paper, it is
important for courts to understand how child soldier claims are
distinguishable from gang-related claims.
On a general level, child soldier and gang-related claims are
substantively distinguishable. Frequently, the nature of the conflict a
child is involved in differs if that child is conscripted as a child soldier
or as a gang member. Though groups like FARC (Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia) confound the distinction,181 child soldiers
will, more often than gang members, be involved in expressly
political conflicts.182 Further, unlike gang members, child soldiers can
be conscripted either by government or nongovernmental forces.183
Each of these facts distinguishes child soldier claims from gangrelated claims, thereby reducing the validity of a floodgates
argument against recognizing age-based child soldier claims.
Perhaps most importantly, the proposed particular social group,
by its very construction, would not be available to children seeking
asylum to avoid having to join gangs. The proposed social group
requires a child to have been conscripted. It is the persecution he or
she suffered as a child soldier that constitutes past persecution for a
claim of humanitarian asylum. The role of the proposed particular
social group definition is to ensure that courts will recognize that the
child applicant was targeted and subsequently persecuted on account
of her membership in a particular social group, i.e. on account of a
179. Matthew J. Lister, Gang-Related Asylum Claims: An Overview and Prescription,
38 U. MEM. L. REV. 827, 828 (2008).
180. Id. at 840; see also Cruz-Alvarez v. Holder, 320 F. App’x 273, 274 (5th Cir. 2009)
(“The characteristics of youth and resistance to gang activity are too generalized and do not
provide a meaningful basis for distinguishing the petitioners from other persons.”).
181. WESSELLS, supra note 21, at 16-17.
182. Id. at 6.
183. See id. at 40.
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protected ground. It is not meant to open the door to children who
have yet to be conscripted but fear future persecution through
conscription. As such, it does not open the door to children who fear
they will be forced to join gangs. While such children may have valid
claims, to recognize all children, conscripted and yet to be
conscripted, resurrects concerns of the over-breadth of age-based
claims. Courts are simply not ready to recognize such claims.184
Accordingly, the proposed definition takes a narrower tack, providing
protection to a well-defined and smaller set of applicants.
The fear of opening the door to gang-based claims through
recognition of any age-based particular social group is merely a
specific expression of the oft-cited floodgates argument. In addition to
the substantive restriction embedded within the language of the
proposed group definition, practical challenges limit the number of
child soldiers who could be granted asylum within the U.S. Taken
together, these substantive and practical limits negate any
floodgates concerns.
Statistics and practical experience illustrate that very few child
soldiers will reach American shores. On a global scale, as many as 20
million children live as refugees or are displaced from their homes.185
If every one of the estimated 300,000 children who live as child
soldiers were refugees, they would still only constitute 1.5% of the
overall child refugee population.186 In 2008, only 5000 children
attempted to enter the U.S. without parents or guardians, or .025% of
the overall child refugee population.187 The percentage of those 5000
children who are likely to have been child soldiers and will make it to
American shores, while unknown, is likely to be minuscule.188
Children are, quite practically, unlikely to have the resources
necessary to flee to the U.S.189 On the one hand, these statistics are
regrettable, as they illustrate the fact that few child soldiers escape
their persecution and find security and rehabilitative care. On the
other hand, these statistics argue in favor of providing the greatest
protection available to those children who are fortunate enough to
escape their persecution.190 There will be no flood of children, no need
to close our borders to the onslaught.
Beyond being limited by the practical challenges of reaching the
U.S., the substantive provisions of this proposal further limit the
184. See, e.g., Escobar v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 363, 364 (3d Cir. 2005) (articulating
concerns that “Honduran street children” do not constitute a sufficiently-tailored particular
social group); see also Lister, supra note 179, at 840.
185. Everett, supra note 11, at 287.
186. See id..
187. Id. at 288.
188. See id. at 288, 349; Morris, supra note 17 at 283-84.
189. See Morris, supra note 17, at 283-84.
190. Everett, supra note 11, at 349-50.
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number of child soldier applicants who will be eligible for asylum.
Reports indicate that nongovernment armed forces and governments
in seventeen conflicts throughout the world actively exploit children
as child soldiers.191 Since 2001 reports document the use of child
soldiers in twenty-seven different countries.192 These numbers, while
too high, create a delineated space in which persecutors target
children as child soldiers. Recall that the proposed definition requires
the child applicant to show, through country reports or similar
reports from human rights organization, that groups within the
country of persecution systematically exploit children as child
soldiers. This substantive requirement, taken with the reality that
the use of child soldiers is limited to certain countries, means that
not all children will be able to satisfy the requirement. Thus, in
tandem, the limitations work to counter arguments that recognizing
the proposed group definition will open the floodgates to former child
soldier claims.
V. LOST NO LONGER: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
If the law moves in baby steps, the proposal of this Note moves
asylum law forward in this vein. There are no calls for a sweeping
overhaul of particular social group doctrine, no demands that all
children at risk of conscription or who have suffered as child soldiers
be automatically granted asylum. In contrast, the proposal is simple:
In certain conflicts, in a limited number of countries in the world,
governments and rebel groups target and exploit children because
they are children. Courts must not turn a blind eye to this reality.
Rather, they must acknowledge it and respond appropriately by
recognizing such children belong to a particular social group for the
purpose of their past persecution. Doing so will enable these children
to gain the protection of humanitarian asylum, a door to security,
and the opportunity to prosper in a new country. Until the
international community succeeds in eradicating the use of child
soldiers, the best we can hope for is that more children have stories
like that of Ishmael Beah. Courts’ recognition of the proposed
particular social group definition would be one small step toward
achieving that goal.

191. COALITION, supra note 14, at 3 (Noting that the use of child soldiers in seventeen
conflicts as of the beginning of 2008 represents a decrease from their use in twenty-seven
conflicts as of 2004. However, the report attributes that decrease not to successful efforts to
combat the use of child soldiers, but rather to the resolution of certain conflicts.).
192. WESSELLS, supra note 21, at 11.

